Planning: The millennial prospect by Hall, Peter
Artikels / Articles
Planning: the millennial prospect
Peter Hall
Abstract
In the quarter century since 1975, though the environmental agenda has remained in 
the foreground, we have seen the arrival of a new set of concerns: above all globalisa­
tion, the spectacular deconstruction of the old manufacturing and goods-handling 
economy in many cities, and the arrival of a new knowledge economy and networked 
society. Our concern everywhere, in city after city, has been to regenerate decaying 
urban economies by injecting new activities. Left and right have disagreed about the 
precise remedy, but those disagreements are themselves now part of history: the old 
economy is largely gone, and no one expects its return. The problem is that the formal 
or modem sector is too often struggling to survive, and too often giving up the battle. 
It cannot compete, for multiple reasons: under-education, poor infrastructure, lack of 
credit and failure to access global markets. So we find cities that lack a formal eco­
nomic base, cities in which the great majority of people live in informal slums and eke 
out an existence in the informal economy.
BEPLANNING: MILLENNIUM-VOORUITSIGTE
Hoewel die omgewingsagenda in die vyf en twintig jaar na 1975 prioriteit geniet het, 
het 'n nuwe stel probleme opgeduik: bowe alles globalisering, die geweldige dekon- 
struksie van die ou vervaardigings- en goedere hanteringsekonomie in baie stede, en 
die nuwe gemeenskap met nuut gevonde inligtingsekonomie en -tegnologie. Ons 
grootste kommer is hoe om die talle vervalle stedelike ekonomiee waarmee ons te 
make het deur middel van nuwe aktiwiteitete te heraktiveer. Links en regs verskil van 
mening oor wat die regte inspuiting sou wees, maar daardie verskille le nou in die 
verlede; die ou ekonomie het grootliks verdwyn -  almal weet dit. Die probleem is 
daarin gelee dat die formele of die modeme sektor heel dikwels sukkel om te oorleef 
en dikwels tou opgooi. Dit kan om verskeie redes nie kompeteer nie, as gevolg van 
swak skoling, swak infrastruktuur, 'n gebrek aan krediet en die ontoeganklikheid van 
die wereldmarkte. Die gevolg is dat die stede te kort skiet aan 'n formele ekonomiese 
basis waarvan die meeste inwoners in informele krotbuurtes woon terwyl hulle op 'n 
manier 'n bestaan probeer maak in die informele sektor.
In a paper such as this, one should look to the future. So it may sound 
eccentric, or even to reflect advanced 
age, to start by talking about the past. 
But in trying to forecast the future, 
there can be no greater mistake than 
ignoring the burden of history.
History is about where we have come 
from, forecasting is about where we 
are going to, and the two are con­
nected along a single continuum. 
Forecasting is, or should be, about 
writing history backwards. There can 
be no better time to reflect on such 
elemental connections than on the 
millennium, and this paper comes
more than a year late for that purpose, 
millennial remarks may still be ap­
propriate. So I propose first to go 
back briefly, and then to spend rather 
more time discussing the future.
Looking back...
I would not propose to go back a mil­
lennium, because the space is lacking 
to do justice to it, but I would like to 
plea for your indulgence, in going 
back a century. The prevailing 
Zeitgeist has powerfully affected the 
planning movement in the twentieth 
century, above all by perceptions of 
the major economic or social 
problems of the period (Hall 2000).
Around 1900, we had Ebenezer 
Howard's slim but momentous book, 
and Patrick Geddes was making 
himself heard. Housing was the great 
question of the day. The pioneers of 
the modem planning movement 
sought an answer to the problems of 
overcrowded urban slums. Their 
answer was central urban renewal at 
lower densities, plus new garden 
cities and garden suburbs on green 
fields. In its origin the 20th century 
planning movement was an out­
growth of the housing reform and 
land reform movement, and remained 
firmly coupled to it. Planned disper­
sion would rely heavily on the new 
technologies o f electric power and 
low-cost public transport, above all 
the electric tramway. We can see that 
very strongly over the following 
quarter-century, down to and ■ 
including the Regional Planning 
Association with their concept of the 
Fourth Migration from city back to 
countryside.
Around 1925, almost exactly a 
quarter-century later, the main 
developments were on the European 
mainland and were the brainchildren 
of the modernist movement in 
architecture. Le Corbusier in Paris, 
Ernst May in Frankfurt, Martin 
Wagner and Hugo Haring and Hans 
Scharoun and Walter Gropius in 
Berlin, designed bold new housing 
projects, even bolder new city 
sections, many of which actually got 
built. Henri Sellier in Paris was 
designing the first Paris cites-jardins 
and in Amsterdam H. P. Berlage was 
laying out the great Amsterdam South 
scheme.
All these schemes were essentially 
quite high-density, often with 
apartment blocks, planned as an 
integral part of the city and connected
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to it by good public transport. They 
stemmed from a very distinct 
continental style of urban apartment 
living. But they had this in common 
with the British origins: they were 
essentially social housing schemes, 
and the link between housing and 
planning remained the key.
Come forward to the mid-century, 
1950. The years after World War II 
saw a huge burst of planning activity, 
especially in Europe: the great 
strategic plans for London, 
Copenhagen, Stockholm and much 
later Paris. The motivation was 
comprehensive postwar reconstruc­
tion; effectively, it represented a 
continuation or completion of those 
"earlier planning movements after the 
long delay of world depression and 
world war, now strongly associated 
with a wider social agenda: the 
building of the welfare state.
Fast-forward another quarter-century, 
to 1975. Now, we find a remarkable 
worldwide disjuncture: a change in 
Zeitgeist that coincided with the 
arrival of the postwar 'baby boomers' 
into political and public life. The 
activists of this generation effectively 
rejected many of the values of their 
parents: they saw comprehensive 
reconstruction and construction, 
large-scale development and auto 
mobility as positively bad, and their 
slogan, from E P Schumacher, was 
"small is beautiful". Protection of the 
environment was now the basic im­
perative; professional technocracies 
were seen as the enemy, and the 
demand was for bottom-up advocacy- 
style planning. Strangely, some of 
these themes accorded with a right- 
wing agenda, which dominated 
politics in many countries during the 
following decade; both were anti- 
govemment, though from quite 
different standpoints.
In the quarter century since 1975, 
though the environmental agenda has 
remained in the foreground, we have 
seen the arrival of a new set of
concerns: above all globalisation, the 
spectacular deconstruction of the old 
manufacturing and goods-handling 
economy in many cities, and the 
arrival o f a new knowledge economy 
and networked society. Our concern 
everywhere, in city after city, has 
been to regenerate decaying urban 
economies by injecting new 
activities. Left and right have dis­
agreed about the precise remedy, but 
those disagreements are themselves 
now part of history: the old economy 
is largely gone, and no one expects its 
return.
What we also see is that as a result of 
these changes, cities are polarised. 
The great majority has achieved 
relative affluence, though many have 
less security than their parents 
enjoyed; they have a stake in their 
homes and their own local environ­
ments. A critically important 
consequence is that, for the first time 
in the story, the link between housing 
and planning has been broken, even 
in Europe: housing policy is now 
about providing for an unfortunate 
residual minority, as it has been all 
along in the United States and South 
Africa, to a considerable degree in 
Australia.
Enough of this historical canter 
through the twentieth century; let me 
try to extract some general themes 
from it, which might serve as pointers 
for the job of prediction. Clearly a 
number of different forces were 
operating during the twentieth 
century, which affected the ways that 
western cities grew and changed.
One, clearly, was demographic and 
social: the fall in birth rates, modified 
by short-lived baby booms; big 
migrant movements, especially from 
the developing world to the cities of 
the developed world; the fall in 
average household size.
Economic change played a major part 
too, particularly through 
deindustrialisation after 1970. Most 
basic of all was the impact of
technology. Suburbanisation 
depended first on the tram and the 
bus, then after World War Two on 
widespread car ownership; electrifi­
cation and the spread o f the telephone 
were equally significant, all acting as 
agents of deconcentration. The 
Internet is taking these processes 
further, continuing the work begun by 
the telephone.
Finally, as already discussed, there 
was the influence o f  ideas. They 
came from outside, and all of them 
reflected the prevailing Zeitgeist. In 
city after city, we see the influence of 
the city beautiful movement, the 
garden city movement, the strategic 
planning ideal, planning for 
sustainability and urban renaissance. 
In each case, as I have argued, these 
ideas were reactions to situations, to 
problem sets, that were perceived as 
important by planners and other 
urban policy-makers at the time. So it 
is very difficult to separate the ideas 
from the context.
... and looking forward
Can we now speculate on the impact 
of these forces in the century to 
come? As before, and also in the 
future, I will argue that we need to 
distinguish between general trends 
and specific manifestations.
In doing so, I want to present some 
key conclusions of the study Urban 
Future 21, commissioned by the 
German government and prepared for 
an international conference in Berlin 
last year (Hall & Pfeiffer 2000a 
2000b). In it we sought to forecast the 
main directions of change in the 
urban economy, and in urban society, 
across the world. I propose to present 
them generally, but to point out what 
I think may be some particular points 
of relevance to the South African 
case -  though I do so with trepida­
tion, because my knowledge of 












































At the outset o f our report, we point 
out that just after the millennium -  in 
fact just about now -  another great 
human milestone will be passed: for 
the first time in history, a majority of 
the world's six billion people will live 
in cities. Between 2000 and 2025, the 
world's urban population will double, 
to reach five billion; city-dwellers 
will rise from 47 per cent to over 61 
per cent of the world's population.
But that is not all. Most o f  this 
explosive growth will occur in the 
cities of the developing world. There 
will be a doubling of the urban 
population, in the coming quarter 
entury, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in Asia and in Africa 
together -  above all in Africa. Even by 
2015, the UN predict that there will be 
358 "million cities", with one million 
or more people, no less than 153 will 
be in Asia. And there will be 27 
"mega-cities", with ten million or 
more -  18 of them in Asia. It is here, 
in the exploding cities of some of the 
poorest countries of the world, that the 
central challenge lies.
A huge challenge, to be sure -  but 
also a huge range of opportunities: 
opportunities for greater freedom 
above all for development, as people 
leave behind their traditional bondage 
to the land and the total dominance of 
the daily struggle for food. Urbaniza­
tion, in fact, is a basic precondition 
for development. But it does not 
guarantee development. Managing 
urban growth for economic advance, 
reconciling it with managing 
ecologically sustainable forms of 
development and reducing social 
exclusion, will represent a key 
challenge for the new century.
Today we can already see the great 
transforming force of the century to 
come: it is the 'information 
revolution', which is already bringing 
cities together in complex global 
systems of interaction and interde­
pendence. The key question is how 
we can shape technological advance
so that it liberates us and becomes 
accessible to all cities and its 
inhabitants.
Again, the challenge comes from the 
burgeoning cities of the developing 
world, where there is a paradox: 
people are still flooding into these 
cities, too many children are being 
bom in those cities based on the hope 
for a better life: but too often they are 
being cheated. For urban growth has 
brought a sharp rise in urban poverty: 
according to UNFPA estimates, over 
one in four of the people in the cities 
of the developing world lives below 
official poverty lines, and that 
proportion rises to more than one in 
three in the Middle East and North 
Africa and to more than two in four 
in sub-Saharan Africa. And a large 
proportion o f the poorest are women.
In these cities, the quality of the 
environment is not improving; in far 
too many cases, it is deteriorating. 
The problem is daunting. Many of 
these cities are already bigger than 
their equivalents in the developed 
world, and are projected to become 
yet larger. Most have only recently 
started on their development process. 
And, with some conspicuous 
exceptions, they lack the governmen­
tal structures and the administrative 
traditions to tackle the resulting 
problems. To be fair, they have 
achieved a great deal against 
overwhelming odds; and some have 
emerged as models for the rest of the 
world. But they are too few, and their 
example is not spreading fast enough.
What will the people of these cities 
want for themselves and their 
children? Surely, what people have 
wanted throughout history: satisfying 
work that yields freedom from 
poverty; life in a well-integrated 
society with stable networks of 
neighbours and friends; existing in 
ecological harmony with the natural 
environment; with adequate mobility 
to reach work, shops, schools, friends 
and recreation; acting as a citizen
within a political system that offers 
balanced representation of interests 
and values; enjoying adequate public 
services from sewers to schools, 
which provide for the basic needs o f 
all the people in that city; and living 
in a built environment that preserves 
tradition but serves the needs of 
modem economic life and modem 
lifestyles. All these, we say, are 
dimensions of 'sustainable urban 
development'. To be called really 
sustainable, a city must score on all 
of them. Today, no city in the world 
can lay claim to such a title.
At the start o f  a new century, the 
demands of sustainable development 
represent a huge and daunting 
challenge. But there are grounds for 
optimism. First, the history of the last 
century has shown that technology 
can fundamentally alter patterns of 
urban life and work. Second, cities 
will continue to democratize their 
decision-making processes, making 
city governments more responsive. 
Third, there is a real prospect that 
population growth, the source o f so 
many problems, will soon slow down, 
as the number of children per family 
will decrease. Fourth, we expect 
economic growth to continue, 
especially in the developing world, 
thus producing the needed resources. 
Fifth, in the developing world -  at 
least for the next quarter century, and 
perhaps for longer -  we will 
increasingly recognise the need to 
build on the strengths of the informal 
sector, incorporating it progressively 
into the mainstream economic world, 
thus including millions of poor urban 
people in the economic development 
process.
That last point is crucial. We want to 
argue now that there are, very crudely 
and simplistically, three different 
kinds of city in the world, with three 
different sets of key problems.
The first can be called the city coping 
with informal hyper growth. It is 
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sub-Saharan Africa and in the Indian 
subcontinent, by the Moslem Middle 
East, and by some of the poorer cities 
of Latin America and the Caribbean.
It is characterized by rapid population 
growth, both through migration and 
natural increase; an economy heavily 
dependent on the informal sector; 
very widespread poverty, with wide­
spread informal housing areas; basic 
problems of the environment and of 
public health; and difficult issues of 
governance.
The second is the city coping with 
dynamic growth. It is the characteris­
tic city o f the middle-income rapidly 
developing world, represented by 
much of East Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Middle 
East. Here, population growth is 
reducing, and some of these cities 
face the prospect of an ageing 
population. Economic growth 
continues rapidly, but with new 
challenges from other countries. 
Prosperity brings environmental 
problems.
We call our third type the mature city 
coping with ageing. This is the 
characteristic city of the advanced 
world of North America, Europe, 
Japan and parts of East Asia, and 
Australasia. It is characterized by 
stable or declining population, the 
challenge of ageing and of household 
fissioning, slow economic growth and 
adaptation, and social polarization. 
But it does have resources to tackle 
environmental problems, if  it 
chooses. Its cities are characterized 
by very widespread dispersion and by 
reconcentration, leading to the growth 
of smaller cities and a challenge to 
the viability of the older central 
cities. Our description concentrates 
predominantly on the European type 
of mature ageing city.
Maybe, the city in the transitional 
economies of Eastern Europe and 
East Asia should be treated as a 
special fourth category. But it is 
difficult, because these cities are not
at all homogeneous: they differ 
hugely in their stage of development 
and in their recent economic history. 
So it is easier to include them under 
the three main categories.
However, I have a special problem 
with the South African city, apart 
from that small detail o f having 
arrived yesterday, and that is that I 
suspect that -  perhaps uniquely -  it 
belongs to all three of these catego­
ries. That is, there are parts of South 
African cities, and there are specific 
population groups in South African 
cities, that belong to each of the three 
groups. O f course, to any urbanist, 
there is nothing particularly startling 
about this: it is what we have always 
called plural cities, and everyone has 
always accepted that African cities 
are plural cities. So, indeed, today, 
are London and New York and Los 
Angeles and Singapore -  but in very 
different ways from what we find in 
South African cities.
What is different, I suspect, is the 
very big gulf that separates different 
parts of the South African city, nearly 
a decade after the end of apartheid, 
in terms of economic and social 
development and cultural assump­
tions. And that makes it uniquely 
difficult, I suspect, for planners to 
produce one-size-fits-all prescrip­
tions. In our report, we develop two 
scenarios for each of these three 
kinds of city. First, we ask where the 
trends will take these cities, all three 
types of them, by the year 2025.
This 'trend' scenario assumes that 
there is no major new policy inter­
vention, either at national or city 
level, to alter the underlying trends. 
Then, we pose the critical question: 
suppose governments act, more 
strongly but sensitively, to influence 
the driving forces and thus to deflect 
the trends? This is the 'bending the 
trend' scenario.
There is not the space to spell these 
scenarios out in detail, but I will try
to underline the key policy prescrip­
tions for each kind of city: what they 
must do if  they are to survive the 
challenges of the next century.
Firstly...
The city coping with informal 
hyper growth
In this kind of city, the key problem 
is that the urban economy fails to 
keep pace with the growth of the 
people. There are high birth rates -  
a product o f sexual ignorance, super­
stition and above all poorly educated 
women. This plus continued migra­
tion from the countryside, produces 
a huge surplus of unskilled labour. 
They go into the only work they can 
find, in the informal economy: casual 
work and petty trading. This leaves 
them in dire poverty -  especially the 
women and above all for female­
headed households, which are more 
than 30% of the poor population.
The problem is that the formal or 
modem sector is too often struggling 
to survive, and too often giving up 
the battle. It cannot compete, for 
multiple reasons: under-education, 
poor infrastructure, lack of credit and 
failure to access global markets. So 
we find cities that lack a formal 
conomic base, cities in which the 
great majority of people live in infor­
mal slums and eke out an existence in 
the informal economy. They have 
little work and they live at the margin 
of existence, in places that lack the 
basics for a civilised life. They have 
no respect for the environment, 
because they cannot afford to do 
anything except struggle for survival. 
And they find it hard to contact to 
worthwhile jobs, even if they had the 
skills, because they cannot reach 
them.
There is a solution to all this, though 
it may sound paradoxical. First, it is 
to get the birth rate down, which 
means education, above all education 
for the girls. We think that there is a 
tremendous role for information 










































cost machines that do not need to 
depend on erratic mains electricity.
Then, it is progressively to formalise 
the informal economy. Cities can do 
this in various ways: strengthening 
relationships to the mainstream 
economy, both for inputs and 
outputs -  for instance, through micro 
credit, providing building materials 
and food and water, and more 
effective transportation to help people 
access a wider range of jobs. They 
can achieve this best through 
communal self-help neighbourhood 
projects, backed up by informal 
levies to pay for materials, which can 
help overcome bottlenecks in basic 
infrastructure. Micro credit schemes, 
providing tiny loans so people can 
start their own businesses, will play a 
particularly crucial role.
The city coping with dynamic growth
In these cities there is some good 
news: the trend is for population 
growth to fall sharply, because of 
urbanisation, as people see that the 
costs o f education and rearing 
children rise while the economic 
value of children goes down. And this 
has a further knock-on effect: there is 
a big rise in the number of working- 
age people relative to the young and 
the old, who have to be looked after.
This is not the end of the good news. 
In these cities, the great passage from 
the informal to the formal economy is 
well under way. Many of them are 
very attractive to inward investment, 
because they offer a well-educated 
and well-trained labour force at lower 
wages than in developed cities, and 
besides economic growth is 
generating big domestic markets for 
consumer durables like cars and 
refrigerators and personal computers. 
There is a sting in the tale there, 
though: this investment can always be 
diverted to even lower-cost countries 
and cities, as some Latin American 
cities are now finding to their cost. 
The key is to keep trading up into
more sophisticated levels of produc­
tion, especially advanced services.
The main result o f all this is that 
cities in this group all find themselves 
in a state of quite extraordinary 
dynamism but also of rapid transition. 
It often seems as if  they are going 
through every stage of economic 
development at once. Or rather, 
different sections of their population 
are going through different stages. 
Side by side,.in the downtown 
business districts you can see 
gleaming new high-rise office towers 
housing global corporations that 
provide advanced business services; 
along the arterial expressways, sleek 
suburban factories that are pouring 
out consumer goods; and, in between, 
wretched informal slum settlements 
where the people struggle to make a 
basic living by performing odd jobs 
or selling trinkets. These cities are 
simultaneously first world cities and 
third world cities.
One result is that they are highly 
polarised. Many of them, though not 
all, display extraordinary contrasts in 
wealth and poverty. A frightening 
sign is to see heavily gated and armed 
luxury apartment blocks or country- 
club type developments, next to 
wretched shacks. All too often, there 
are reports of escalating crime and 
violence. The poor, some of them, 
may find solace in drink or drugs, 
compounding the problem. Because 
the poor have to find somewhere to 
live, they often contribute to environ­
mental disasters by building their 
homes on unstable hillsides or on 
floodplains, with results that are 
sometimes tragic. Even when they 
and their homes survive, they are 
often located far from job opportuni­
ties, with poor or non-existent bus 
services, compounded by traffic 
congestion.
The answer to these problems is to 
continue to push the economy in the 
direction first o f advanced manufac­
turing and then of advanced services,
always keeping one step ahead of the 
global competition. Of course, cities 
cannot provide all the necessary 
policies on their own: nation states 
have to provide the right framework 
of macro-economic policies. But 
cities can do a lot, especially if  they 
are given the right degree o f adminis­
trative and fiscal autonomy -  which 
many of them have been getting, 
already, during the last twenty years. 
Above all, they must and they can 
help their poorest citizens to join the 
mainstream economy and the 
mainstream society.
One important key is to help them 
formalise their housing: to use com­
munal self-help to provide the neces­
sary infrastructure, so that they begin 
to turn their informally built areas 
into middle-class suburbs. In count­
less Latin American cities, it has been 
happening and is still happening. In 
many eastern Asian cities, the 
approach has been different: the city 
itself has intervened to tear down 
informal settlements and provide 
high-quality housing, first for rent, 
later for sale. There is no one right 
way here; there are different paths 
towards the same goal.
It is the same with transport. Some 
Eastern Asian cities have deliberately 
encouraged high-density development 
which will support a top-quality 
metro system -  and some, like Hong 
Kong and Singapore, had no choice 
because they had so little land. Some 
Latin American cities have made 
extraordinary innovations in 
operating bus systems to serve their 
more far-flung residential areas -  and 
one of the most extraordinary o f all, 
Curitiba in Brazil, has created a bus 
system that works like a metro, with 
local buses that feed into an express 
system travelling on its own tracks. 
But there is an interesting point: if 
one visits Singapore and Curitiba, the 
two cities look very alike, because 
both integrated their land use and 
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development along their main 
transportation corridors Again, there 
is more than one way towards the 
same goal, but in the end the 
outcomes may be very similar.
It is no accident, perhaps, that 
Curitiba and Singapore are now two 
o f the richest cities in this group of 
cities; in effect both have made the 
transition into the developed world, 
and both are technologically and 
organisationally among the world's 
most advanced cities. Last of all, we 
come to the kind of city that much of 
Johannesburg is, and London and 
New York and Paris and Tokyo and 
many of the world's greatest cities:
The mature city coping with ageing
The main problem of these cities is 
not the problem of either of the first 
two types. Basically, they have 
solved the big economic problem 
because they industrialised earlier 
and deindustrialised earlier. They are 
not advanced service cities, in which 
the great majority o f people do not 
make things that you can drop on 
your toe. But this process has been 
far from painless. The deindustriali­
sation, which began about thirty years 
ago and is still continuing, has left far 
too many people without jobs and 
without much prospect of finding 
jobs.
That problem can only be met by 
education and then more education: 
above all, education for the sons and 
the daughters of that lost industrial 
labour force. But too often, it is 
failing to happen: these cities all tend 
to have concentrated islands of 
multiple deprivation, where entire 
families suffer from long-term 
unemployment that persists from one 
generation to another, and where 
local school systems just do not 
perform the necessary job of lifting 
the next generation out of this slough 
of despond.
We know that it will be a very 
complex job, demanding action on a
number of fronts: education, training, 
housing and social services. And we 
suspect that conventional answers, 
conventional policies, may prove 
counter-productive. American and 
British cities are pursuing welfare 
policies that actively encourage the 
unemployed back into the labour 
force. But it is far from easy: despite 
some successes, there seems to be a 
hard core of young unemployed who 
lack the basic skills, including the 
personal presentational skills, that 
you need to perform at all in the 
modem urban service economy. But 
it is above all a learning process.
This is important because no society 
should contemplate wasted lives like 
these. But it is not just that: the irony 
is that they are the precise equivalents 
of those people in the informal 
economy in those other kinds of 
cities, excluded from the mainstream 
economy and mainstream society. 
Sometimes this is because they 
belong to recent groups of migrants 
who have come in large and 
increasing numbers into American 
and European cities, especially 
because they are fleeing from local 
conflicts in the 1990s. These 
migrants, arriving suddenly and 
unexpectedly into highly- 
sophisticated urban economies for 
which they are ill-prepared, represent 
an emerging problem for cites in the 
21st century, albeit by no means new: 
cities in 1990 experienced it, and the 
great-grandchildren of those migrants 
can testify that the problem can solve 
itself, with help.
More worrying is the fact that longer- 
established generations of urban 
residents may become marginalised, 
because they live in segregated and 
ghettoised communities, which are 
effectively cut off from the main­
stream of urban economic and social 
life. This is the story o f some Afro- 
Americans in cities like Chicago and 
Detroit, o f some second- and third- 
generation Turks in German cities, of 
North African young men in the Paris
suburbs. They represent the extreme 
version of the general problem left by 
deindustrialisation.
The solution can only be education, 
education and yet more education. 
And here, as in the cities o f the 
developing world, technology will 
have a major impact. Here is one 
prediction of which we can be sure: 
information technology, especially 
the internet and its successors, will 
transform the way we educate our 
young, creating in the process an 
entire new industry and a potent new 
source of economic growth. But the 
cities of the developed world share 
one other major problem. They are 
mature in more than one sense: they 
are cities of ageing people. People 
over 65 have increased from just 
under 8 per cent in 1950 to 13.5 per 
cent today and are expected to reach 
nearly 25 per cent by 2050; the most 
rapidly ageing countries -  which 
include Germany, Italy and Japan 
will approach or exceed 40 per cent. 
We find it hard to forecast the effects 
on life in cities; we can only ask these 
questions:
Will slower renewal of human 
capital reduce innovative 
potential?
If so, how can urban systems 
stay flexible and innovative?
In particular, could we use 
lifelong learning to overcome the 
ageing of knowledge?
Could the family -  the basic 
producer of care and personal 
services for elderly people 
through the centuries -  be 
replaced by new associations (of 
elders), who take over the role of 
families as provider of services? 
How do societies deal with a 
rising burden of dependency, 
with fewer and fewer younger 
working people having to 
generate more and more wealth 
to support increasing numbers of 
pensioners? If past trends 
continue, in 2030, public spend­











































countries will be more than 16 
per cent o f GDP. How will these 
younger working people react 
politically to the growing social 
security taxes? How will they 
cope with the resulting reduced 
incentives to work, or with the 
possible flight o f capital to other 
nations and other cities?
Ironically, one answer to these 
problems could be that mature cities 
will again have to open their doors to 
welcome a new generation of 
immigrants. As in the 1950s and 
1960s, they will be ready to do the 
basic service jobs that an ageing 
population will need doing, especially 
in the labour-intensive caring profes­
sions. But that means paying for 
them. One crucial need, for all devel­
oped nations, will be to get the entire 
funding of pensions on a firmer con­
tributory base; there is no time to 
waste here.
At the same time, these cities will 
have to constantly generate new 
wealth in the face of constant 
competition from the next-tier cities; 
the Singapore's and all the cities that 
will follow in their path. That means 
constant transition into ever-more 
advanced services, including 
especially services built upon the new 
information technologies, and 
services that improve the quality of 
life. There is an important moral here. 
Cities must try to enhance their own 
innovative potential. But they must 
also compete to attract inward 
investment. One way to do that is to 
offer an especially high quality of 
life. Some mature cities are already in 
the forefront here: in Europe, cities 
like Freiburg, Karlsruhe, Strasbourg,
Zurich, Bologna, Amsterdam, 
Copenhagen; in North America, cities 
like Portland (Oregon) and Toronto. 
But cities in the dynamic group of 
countries, like Singapore and 
Curitiba, are constantly offering 
competition, and their numbers will 
grow. So mature cities will need to 
keep a step ahead of the action. They 
have one overriding advantage: 
despite the process of diffusion, they 
still contain by far the largest part of 
the truly innovative firms using the 
most advanced technologies. That 
means that they can and should seek 
to develop these technologies and to 
apply them first in their own cities, as 
demonstration projects to the rest o f 
the world. There is one challenge, in 
particular: to develop an environmen­
tally benign successor to today's car.
In some European countries, it is 
surely significant that the Green 
movement have recognised that the 
car is a liberating agent as well as an 
environmental problem, and that the 
task is to develop as soon as possible 
its non-polluting successor, call it the 
ecocar. It would have two key 
features. It would be powered by 
zero- or minimal-emission fuel: most 
probably a fuel cell, but possibly 
electric power picked up by induction 
from the street, and possibly 
dual-mode. And it would depend to a 
very great degree on sophisticated 
electronic technology to control it, so 
that -  at least on city streets and 
freeways -  it would have many of the 
characteristics of the automated 
vehicles we encounter in airports and 
in some urban transit systems like the 
London Docklands Light Rail. 
European, American and Japanese 
companies are now in a race to
produce it: cities like Stuttgart, 
Detroit and Hiroshima should be 
preparing to make themselves 
demonstration cities for the new 
technology, living illustrations of the 
urban world to come.
There is no specific prescription for 
this. There may well be different 
technologies. There is certainly more 
than one recipe for building attractive 
cities that can offer their people the 
good life. As John Maynard Keynes 
so brilliantly forecast seventy years 
ago, more and more, as cities over­
come their most pressing economic 
problems, their quality of life will 
become a critical issue.
In Europe, we have been experiment­
ing in this art for two and a half 
thousand years, with some modest 
success: consider Florence, Paris, 
Amsterdam, Munich and London. But 
we do not claim a monopoly, and 
newer cities too can join in this 
particular form of global competition. 
The mature cities should lead the way 
in the process that Aristotle so well 
described long ago: we come into 
cities to live, we remain to live the 
good life.
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